Naomi Alderson (UCL) - 2019-20 Students

Implicit Cognition and AgencyRecent studies in empirical psychology have revealed subtle ways in which our actions are influenced by implicit cognition – cognition that typically operates beyond conscious awareness and direct deliberative control. While philosophers such as Jules Holroyd and Michael Brownstein have attempted to provide models of implicit cognition, to explore its role in virtue and to establish what responsibility we bear for its influence on action, relatively little work has been done exploring how the influence of implicit cognition fits into the theory of action. That is the primary goal of my project: I aim to establish whether behaviour governed by implicit cognition should ever be considered an instance of human agency. In answering this question, I aim to explore the ramifications of the psychological findings for traditional conceptions of agency such as those defended by Donald Davidson and Christine Korsgaard.

Recent studies in empirical psychology have revealed subtle ways in which our actions are influenced by implicit cognition – cognition that typically operates beyond conscious awareness and direct deliberative control. While philosophers such as Jules Holroyd and Michael Brownstein have attempted to provide models of implicit cognition, to explore its role in virtue and to establish what responsibility we bear for its influence on action, relatively little work has been done exploring how the influence of implicit cognition fits into the theory of action. That is the primary goal of my project: I aim to establish whether behaviour governed by implicit cognition should ever be considered an instance of human agency. In answering this question, I aim to explore the ramifications of the psychological findings for traditional conceptions of agency such as those defended by Donald Davidson and Christine Korsgaard.

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