Puneh Nejati Mehr (LSE) - 2024-25 Students
p.nejati-mehr@lse.ac.uk

The nature and norms of confidence in reasoning and action

Consider pursuing a challenging goal, like quitting smoking. Achieving such a goal requires perseverance, yet statistically, the odds of success are low. This brings us to a paradox often encountered when deciding whether to pursue difficult goals: On the one hand, rational evaluation of the evidence might lead us to have little confidence in our chances of success. On the other hand, we need a certain level of confidence to motivate us to keep going and succeed. So, does deciding to pursue such a goal become irrational?

My research addresses this question by offering a novel perspective on confidence in decision-making more broadly. I propose that rational decision-making can be cognitively underpinned by two distinct types of confidence: pragmatic confidence and epistemic confidence. While epistemic confidence is about degrees of belief and responds directly to evidence (truth-directed), pragmatic confidence is driven by purpose rather than truth (purpose-directed). In other words, pragmatic confidence fuels actions toward a goal, even when evidence might not fully support success.

My research seeks to enrich the concept of confidence in philosophy, especially in discussions around scientific uncertainty in decision-making. It also aims to provide insights applicable beyond philosophy, benefiting fields like economics, politics, and medicine, where statistical reasoning shapes high-stakes decisions.

Principal Supervisor: Professor Richard Bradley